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Requiem For A Parody
by RANDALL B. HICKS*
I
Introduction
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of an-
titheses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great
problems of the law."' This general statement by Justice Car-
dozo aptly characterizes the conflict between the statutory law
of copyright and the freedom of expression interests of the
parodist.2
Parody is a viable and distinct form of literary expression
that achieves the multifaceted effect of humor, criticism and
satire by imitating the idea or style of expression in a serious
work. It has been said that a well-executed parody "pours criti-
cisms swiftly into an unforgettable mould."3 To develop an ef-
fective parody, the original work must be partially
appropriated or paralleled, as the effect of the parody is depen-
dent on recognition of the original work.4 Conflicts arise, how-
ever, when the copyright holder of the parodied work alleges
infringement due to the parodist's substantial appropriation' of
the copyrighted work.
The doctrine of "fair use" was developed by the courts and
provides for the permissible unlicensed borrowing of copy-
righted works in particular situations.6 The Copyright Act of
* B.A., California State University, Long Beach, 1980; M.S., California State
University, Fullerton, 1984; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 1986; Mr.
Hicks' commentary received First Place in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition.
1. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 4 (1928).
2. See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 205(c) (1984).
3. 17 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA 333 (14th ed. 1956).
4. R. FALK, AMERICAN LITERATURE IN PARODY 13-21 (1955); F. STILLMAN, THE
POET'S MANUAL AND RHYMING DICTIONARY xiv-xv (1985).
5. The substantiality of the taking is one factor in a use analysis, the significance
of which will be discussed in this comment. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying
text.
6. See M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT 380-83 (2d ed. 1979); Comment, Parody and Fair
Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163, 168-72 (1981).
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1976' simply restates the multifactored balancing test created
by the courts.' Unfortunately, no precise standard existed to be
codified, leaving the validity of a fair use defense to be deter-
mined by a consideration of four factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the taking; (2) the nature of the original work;
(3) the relative amount of the original taken; and (4) the effect
of the taking on the marketability of the original work.9
Because the Act basically codified the common law, it did lit-
tle to improve on the vague standard outlined above. Thus,
both prior and subsequent to the adoption of section 107, a par-
odist's reliance on the fair use doctrine remains subject to the
virtually unbounded discretion accorded the judiciary in its ap-
plication of such broad provisions.' ° As one judge stated, "[t]he
doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to
defy definition."'" As applied to parody, little has changed to
alter the validity of author and parodist Mark Twain's state-
ment almost a century ago that "[o]nly one thing is impossible
to God, to find any sense in any copyright law on this planet."' 2
Accordingly, whether a parody appropriates so excessively as
to render it beyond the scope of fair use is a question to be de-
7. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
8. The fair use doctrine has progressed in its application as the breadth of its
scope has expanded. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); Karll v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wisc. 1941).
9. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 reads in full:
Notwithstanding the provisons of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies of phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)
10. Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the
Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 202 (1980); see E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON,
COPYRIGHT (1980).
11. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
12. Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 550, 553
(1966) (quoting MARK TWAIN, NOTEBOOK 381 (1935 ed.)).
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cided on a case-by-case basis. A familiarity with the principal
cases examining parody as fair use, however, demonstrates the
arbitrariness with which the courts have exercised their discre-
tion and the unwarranted importance they have attached to
several of the aforementioned fair use factors. This arbitrari-
ness often results in the refusal to appropriately recognize par-
ody's legitimate role as social commentary or criticism-
legitimate even when the parody operates to the detriment of
the original work or its author.
13
That courts consistently find no fair use in sexually-oriented
or allegedly obscene parodies evidences an apparent bias and
abuse of discretion in the treatment of those parodies. Contrib-
uting to the confusion is the conflict between the Copyright
Act 4 and the constitutional status of allegedly obscene works.
The virtual impossibility of defining and identifying a work as
obscene 5 has contributed to the apparent judicial circumven-
tion. The result is a circuitous destruction of the disdained
work through application of the fair use doctrine. When a
work that offends the taste or moral standards of a particular
court is found to be infringing, the result is the effective de-
struction of that parody. It is curious that such improper mo-
tives have, thus far, been camouflaged by the broad discretion
granted courts by the Copyright Act.
II
The Historical Role of Parody
Parody is one of the oldest forms of literary expression. It
has been recognized as a viable mode of expression, offering
criticism, ridicule, sexuality and amusement.16 Recognizing the
need for parody and addressing his own parodizing of Homer,
Virgil wrote:
I wrote these lines, another wears the bays,
Thus you for others make your nests, 0 Birds,
Thus you for others bear your fleece, 0 Sheep,
Thus you for others honey make, 0 Bees,
13. See id.; see also infra notes 14-23, 125-26.
14. The Copyright Act of 1976 as adopted by Congress was intended to be uniform
and natural in scope. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5745.
15. Obscenity is to be determined by contemporary community standards. Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
16. See generally Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33
CAN. B. REV. 1130 (1955).
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Thus you for others drag the plough, 0 Kine.17
Aristophanes was a recognized parodist, mocking the styles
of Euripides and Sophocles in his plays, The Knights and Battle
of the Frogs and Mice.8 In listing those writers who employed
parody, one authority mentioned such luminaries as Shake-
speare, Pope, Chaucer, Keats, Shelly, Byron, Joyce, Heming-
way and Faulkner. 9
Parodizing another's works has often been viewed as a trib-
ute to the work or the author's popularity. It is said that
Charles Dickens was disappointed when his works were not in-
cluded in a series of parodies in the popular Punch magazine.
20
Parody has actually inspired works that achieved literary
recognition of their own accord. Examples are Don Quixote,
Gulliver's Travels, The Rape of the Lock, and Joseph Andrews.
21
American authors employing parody include Lewis Carroll,22
Mark Twain, S.J. Perelman and James Thurber.
23
It is apparent that where there is literature, parody will fol-
low. Not only does it serve as criticism and entertainment, it is
often a commentary on society and the way it is reflected in
literature. Referring to the important function played by par-
ody, one authority remarked:
[A]lthough a parasitic art and written at times with malice,
parody is as fundamental to literature as is laughter to health.
... The best parody surpasses mere imitation. It stands on its
own feet, containing enough independent humor to be funny
beyond aping of the original ....
There are as many different motives for parody as there are
parodists. Sometimes... it was personal spite. More often the
parodist employed the style of his original to poke fun at cur-
rent follies or vices. He might have a social axe to grind or he
17. Id. at 1133 (citing VITAE VERGILIANAE 31 (Brummer ed. 1912)).
18. M. HODGART, SATIRE 34-35 (1969); A. MARTIN, ON PARODY 3-4 (1896).
19. D. MCDONALD, PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM CHAUCER TO BEERBOHM-
AND AFTER (1960). See generally R. ARMOUR, THE CLASSICS RECLASSIFIED (1960).
20. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
21. Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech: The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by
First Amendment Protection, 20 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 133, 135
(1981-82).
22. F. STILLMAN, supra note 4, at xiv-xv.
23. See generally R. FALK, supra note 4; C. NEIDER, THE COMPLETE HUMOROUS
SKETCHES AND TALES OF MARK TWAIN (1961); S.J. PERELMAN, THE MOST OF S.J. PER-
ELMAN (1958); J. THURBER, THE THURBER CARNIVAL (1964).
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might wish to expose a certain literary school or mannerism
which has hardened into conventionality ....
With a history of twenty-five centuries behind it, parody, it
seems, is here to stay. Like all literature it has had its ups and
downs, but at its best it is more than a parasitic art. It has at-
tracted men and women of major stature and at times has
shown the capacity to outlive the serious work which has in-
spired it.
24
As described by Nimmer, parody remains, a "socially useful
literary genre. ' 25 Its important role as a viable mode of free
expression together with the inherent privilege of free criti-
cism mandate the protection required for its continued contri-
bution to society.
III
Parody And Fair Use In The Courts
American courts began to speak broadly of parody in the fair
use context early in the twentieth century.26 More recently,
however, the uniquely complex characteristics of parody and
the broad subjectivity of the fair use test have resulted in an
unsettling and amorphous standard.
The problem is most evident when copyright infringement is
alleged against a parody of a sexual or allegedly obscene na-
ture. Despite the content-neutral nature of the Copyright
Act,27 the courts appear to utilize the four fair use factors2 to
find copyright infringement when the parody is sexually ex-
plicit, yet find no infringement by more "acceptable" parodies
despite a greater degree of appropriation.
A. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System
The first principle case to raise parody as a defense was
Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,29 which held
that parody was not necessarily a fair use. Comedian Jack
Benny was found to have infringed the copyright to the movie
24. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 600-02 (1965); see M. HODGART, SAT-
IRE 10-78 (1969); C. WELLS, A PARODY ANTHOLOGY xxi-xxx (1904).
25. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(B) (1985).
26. Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
27. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-56
(5th Cir. 1979).
28. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
29. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), cff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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Gaslight in his television parody of it entitled Autolight ° The
original film, starring Charles Boyer and Ingrid Bergman, was
a successful suspense drama. Benny's Autolight used the same
plot, setting and characters with only minor alterations.3 1 A
great deal of the dialogue was also recognizably similar,
although changes had been made to transform the suspense
drama into a comedic farce, entirely different from the original
Gaslight2
2
The defendants claimed that the comedy was burlesque fall-
ing within the legal realm of parody and therefore constituted
fair use.3 3 The court, however, found the parody to be a sub-
stantial taking of the original work and concluded that because
the parody was for commercial gain, it could not be considered
fair use or criticism. 4 Judge Carter's finding of infringement
by Benny would not have been so shocking had he held that the
parody was a taking too excessive to be protected by fair use.
Instead, however, he treated the burlesque taking by Benny as
if it were no different from any other appropriation.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit,36 the
court affirmed the lower court's rationale, stating that to find
burlesque to be a valid dramatic criticism "would seem to be a
parody upon the meaning of criticism. '37 The United States
Supreme Court, voting four to four, affirmed without opinion,38
foregoing an opportunity to clarify the confusion surrounding
the validity of the fair use defense for parody.
The Loew's decision did, however, engender sharp criticism.
Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court commented that the right to parody a work is as via-
ble as the right to criticize it. 9 He stated, "I will not conceal my
view that it was wrong-and possibly unconstitutional-to hold
Jack Benny for his television parody of the movie Gaslight. We
30. 131 F. Supp. at 168.
31. Id. at 165. See FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 182-83 (J. Lawrence & B. Timberg
ed. 1980).
32. 131 F. Supp. at 165.
33. Id. at 172. See Comment, Parody, Copyright, and the First Amendment, 10
U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 569 (1976).
34. 131 F. Supp. at 182-83.
35. Id. at 177. See Goetsch, supra note 21, at 146-50.
36. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
37. Id. at 537.
38. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
39. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967); see C. WELLS,
supra note 24, at xxi-xxx.
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must accept the harsh truth that parody may quite legitimately
aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well
as artistically."4 Judge Leon Yankwich, an acknowledged
copyright scholar, stressed that commercial gain by a parodist
should not obscure the fact that the purpose of copyright legis-
lation is to advance the progress of the arts and sciences.41
B. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.
A similar situation to that in Loew's arose when Sid Caesar
parodied the film From Here to Eternity in his television sketch
From Here to Obscurity.42 Unlike Benny's Gaslight parody,
however, Caesar's taking was held to be insubstantial.43 Here,
Judge Carter found that there was a taking sufficient only "to
cause the viewer to recall and conjure up the original, . . . a
necessary element of burlesque.
'44
Judge Carter's retreat from his earlier decision in Loew's is
apparent. In this subsequent decision he acknowledges that
"[t]he doctrine of fair use permits burlesque to go somewhat
further so long as the taking is not substantial. '45 Unfortu-
nately, the permissible amount of taking of a copyrighted work
allowed to accomplish a parody remained undefined.
C. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.
The defendant, Mad Magazine, published parodied lyrics of
fifty-seven familiar songs.46 "The Last Time I Saw Paris" be-
came "The Last Time I Saw [Roger] Maris," and "A Pretty Girl
is Like a Melody" turned into "Louella Schwartz Describes Her
Malady." Irving Berlin claimed infringement.
Because the Loew's decision found an infringement in par-
ody,47 the district court labeled Mad Magazine's humor as satire
despite the fact that Mad Magazine had labeled its own work
as parody.48
40. B. KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 69.
41. Yankwich, supra note 16, at 1133-37.
42. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
43. Id. at 352. See Kenoe, Parody: Not Always a Laughing Matter, 7 UPDATE 18,
20-21 (1983).
44. 137 F. Supp. at 351.
45. Id. at 350.
46. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
47. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 219 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
48. Id. at 914.
No. 1]
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On appeal to the Second Circuit, Judge Kaufman commented
on the importance of laughter in society and the amusement
resulting from true parody.49 He stated:
At the very least, where .. .it is clear that the parody has
neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for
the original, and where the parodist does not appropriate a
greater amount of the original than is necessary to "recall or
conjure up" the object of his satire, a finding of infringement
would be improper.5"
The court did not address the issue of what constituted the
permissive amount allowed to conjure up the original work, be-
cause it was determined that the Loew's standard of substanti-
ality was not met. 1 In commenting on the Loew's decision,
however, the court discounted the importance of the parodist's
commercial motivations, as the promotion of progress in "Sci-
ence and the useful Arts" may require subordination of the
copyright holder's interest to the greater public interest.52
D. Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp.
The fair use defense for parody infringement, which had
been rendered virtually nonexistent by Loew's, regained viabil-
ity from such decisions as Berlin and Columbia. In Walt Dis-
ney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp.," however, the fair
use defense for parodists was again restricted.
The defendant motion picture company produced the adult
movie The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker. In one scene,
the "Mickey Mouse March" was played as background music
for four minutes, while three young men, nude except for their
Mickey Mouse hats, simultaneously engaged in various sexual
acts with a woman hired by the boys' father for them as a birth-
day present.54 The defendants claimed the music was used to
"'highlight and emphasize the transition of such teenagers
from childhood to manhood.., in a highly comical setting,' and
as such [was] merely a 'humorous take-off of the music.' " 5 5
49. 329 F.2d at 545. See SCHAEFFER, THE ART OF LAUGHTER 3-16 (1981).
50. 319 F.2d at 545. See LAWRENCE, supra note 31, at 322-23; Comment, supra note
12, at 567.
51. 329 F.2d at 545.
52. Id. at 543-44 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). See generally Barron, In Defense
of Fairness: First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37
U. COLO. L. REV. 31 (1964).
53. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
54. Id. at 1397-98; see generally LAWRENCE, supra note 26, at 157-67.
55. 389 F. Supp. at 1398.
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The court noted that the parody was intended for commercial
gain and stated, "While defendants may have been seeking in
their display of bestiality to parody life, they did not parody the
'Mickey Mouse March' but sought only to improperly use the
copyrighted material.""6 The court's sarcasm in referring to the
"display of bestiality to parody life" demonstrates the futility of
a fair use defense when the subject parody is pornographic.
E. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates
The Air Pirates literary publication admittedly copied sev-
eral famous Disney characters, such as Mickey and Minnie
Mouse and Donald Duck, in adult "counter-culture" comic
books. 7 The court denied any fair use and found the taking
substantial, despite the fact that only the actual design of the
characters was copied, not specific illustrations or literary rep-
resentations. The court was compelled, however, to expand
their comments beyond the substantiality of the taking. The
court stated:
While Disney sought only to foster 'an image of innocent de-
lightfulness,' defendants supposedly sought to convey an alle-
gorical message of significance. Put politely by one
commentator, the Air Pirates was 'an underground comic book
which had placed several well-known Disney cartoon charac-
ters in incongruous settings where they engaged in activities
clearly antithetical to the accepted Mickey Mouse world of
scrubbed faces, bright smiles and happy endings.' It centered
around 'a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters as
active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting
counterculture.'58
The court's compulsion to criticize the work's content taints
the credibility of the decision. The cited "polite commentary"
may have eloquently represented the attitude of the court to-
ward the parody at issue, yet it lacked any legal relevancy and
should not have been made part of the decision.
F. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.
The late-night variety program Saturday Night Live used the
fair use defense successfully in defending their parody of New
56. Id.
57. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752-53 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
58. 581 F.2d at 753 (quoting Comment, Parody, Copyright and the First Amend-
ment, supra note 33, at 571).
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York City's advertising theme.5 9 In a television campaign
orchestrated in 1977 to improve the city's suffering image and
financial woes, a top-hatted Broadway showgirl, backed by an
advancing phalanx of dancers, chanted with increasing inten-
sity, "I-I-I-I-I-I Love New Yo-o-o-o-o-ork. '60 Portraying the
mayor and members of the Chamber of Commerce of the bibli-
cal city of Sodom, the show's cast is seen discussing the
problems regarding their city's public image. They solve
Sodom's dilemma with a new advertising campaign. A small
chorus line forms and sings "I Love Sodom" several times to
the melody of "I Love New York. '61 The copyright owner of
the melody claimed infringement.
The district court found that the skit appropriated "the heart
of the composition," yet further found that it constituted fair
use which exempted it from liability.62 The court applied the
guidelines of section 107 of the Copyright Act 6 3 and determined
that the parody did not communicate the same information as
the original, compete with the original work or its marketabil-
ity, or fulfill the demand for the original.64
The court of appeals affirmed the district court in a short per
curiam opinion. The court stated, "In today's world of often
unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the
humor of parody ..6. ",5 In a footnote, the court advocated the
expansion of appropriation for parody:
The District Court concluded, among other things, that the
parody did not make more extensive use of appellant's song
than was necessary to "conjure up" the original .... While we
agree with this conclusion, we note that the concept of "conjur-
ing up" an original came into the copyright law not as a limita-
tion on how much of an original may be used, but as a
recognition that a parody frequently needs to be more than a
fleeting evocation of an original in order to make its humorous
point .... A parody is entitled at least to "conjure up" the
original. Even more extensive use would still be fair use, pro-
vided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as
59. Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. 482 F. Supp. at 743.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 744-45; see generally Comment, The Parody Defense to Copyright: Pro-
ductive Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395 (1984).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
64. 482 F. Supp. at 747.
65. 623 F.2d at 253.
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a known element of modern culture and contributing some-
thing new for humorous effect or commentary.
66
G. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson
The effect of obscenity on the Second Circuit resulted in a
questionable result in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson.67 As in the Disney
cases, the court's failure to refrain from irrelevant critical com-
ments draws attention to the lack of impartial judicial reason-
ing, evidenced in characterizing defendants' production as an
"erotic nude show" consisting of "sex raunchy enough to satisfy
the most jaded porno palate.
'6
The defendant's production, an off-Broadway play entitled
Let My People Come -A Sexual Musical, performed the musical
composition to "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B," but
altered the lyrics to "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C."
'69
The song was performed in the style in which "Bugle Boy" was
very successfully recorded by Bette Midler and the Andrews
Sisters.7 ° When the original composer claimed infringement,
the district court noted that the renditions by Bette Midler and
the Andrew Sisters contained significant additions to the plain-
tiff's song copied by defendants, in which plaintiff had no pro-
tectable interest.7 1 Despite this fact, the court of appeals found
a substantial taking and rejected the fair use defense. The
court stated:
We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can
plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty
lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then es-
cape liability by calling the end result a parody or satire on the
mores of society.72
The court held that a parody must, at least in part, be of the
original work, as opposed to only life in general.73 The court, in
finding "Champion" a substantial taking, refused even to con-
sider it as a parody, stating that "if the copyrighted song is not
at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need to con-
66. Id. at 253 n.1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd as modified, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
68. 677 F.2d at 181.
69. Id. at 181-82. See Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57
WASH. L. REV. 163, 185-86 (1981).
70. 425 F. Supp. at 454-55
71. Id.
72. 677 F.2d at 185.
73. Id. at 185.
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jure it up."74 As in Loew's, the majority also emphasized de-
fendants' commercial intent.
In a strong dissent, Judge Mansfield stated that "Champion"
was a viable parody entitled to the protection of the fair use
doctrine.75 He also chided the majority for the improper moral
basis of their decision:
The majority implies that to "substitute dirty lyrics" should
not permit a person to "escape liability by calling the end re-
sult a parody or satire on the mores of society." In my view the
defendants' use of "dirty lyrics" or of language and allusions
that I might personally find distasteful or even offensive is
wholly irrelevant to the issue before us, which is whether the
defendants' use, obscene or not, is permissible under the fair
use doctrine as it has evolved over the years. We cannot, under
the guise of deciding a copyright issue, act as a board of censors
outlawing X-rated performances. Obscenity or pornography
play no part in this case. Moreover, permissible parody,
whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for suc-
cess, just as a public figure must tolerate more personal attack
than the average private citizen.76
H. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders marketed a poster display-
ing five cheerleaders posed in their official outfits, with large
script at the bottom of the poster stating "Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders. '77 A poster mimicking the original was later cre-
ated, displaying five former Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders in
poses and outfits very similar to the original poster, except that
the former cheerleaders had their vests unbuttoned displaying
their breasts. The logo beneath the second poster was "Ex-Dal-
las Cheerleaders.
7 8
The court found that the parody was not protected under the
fair use doctrine, and commented that "[t]he first amendment
is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intel-
lectual property. ' 79
74. Id.
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
77. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184
(5th Cir. 1979).
78. Id. at 1186.
79. Id. at 1188 (citations omitted). See Samuelson, Revising Zacchini: Analyzing
First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L.
REv. 836, 878-94 (1983).
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I. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies
The owners of the Superman copyright sought to enjoin
ABC from airing its series The Greatest American Hero.80 The
series told of a high school teacher named Ralph Hinckley.
One night, while Hinckley is stranded in the desert, aliens pro-
vide him with a red leotard-type suit and cape. When worn, the
outfit gives him the same superhuman powers as Superman:
X-ray vision, long distance hearing, the ability to resist bullets
and the power to fly. Hinckley, however, loses the instruction
manual for the magic suit and he bungles nearly every attempt
to exercise his new abilities.8 1
The pilot episode made several references to Superman.
When Hinckley donned his outfit for the first time, he re-
marked, "It's a bird, it's a plane, it's Ralph Hinckley. 's2
The district court found the series to be a parody of Super-
man and other characters in the superhuman genre. The court
stated, "A comparison of the characters Ralph Hinckley and
Superman and their respective stories reveals.., that they are
so dissimilar as to preclude a finding of substantial similarity
.... '[I]t should be emphasized that under the law only sub-
stantial similarity will support a determination of
infringement.' ",83
On final hearing, the district court found there was no sub-
stantial similarity and granted summary judgment for defend-
ant. 4 The issue of parody was never discussed. On appeal, the
Second Circuit commented on parodies which use the exact or
nearly exact wording of a fragment of the copyrighted work:
The "parody" branch of the "fair use" doctrine is itself a means
of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law. It
also balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas with
the copyright holder's interest in the exclusive use of his work.
Especially in an era of mass communications, it is to be ex-
pected that phrases and other fragments of expression in a
highly successful copyrighted work will become part of the
language.... It is decidedly in the interests of creativity, not
80. Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981), on final hearing, 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), qff'd 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
81. 523 F. Supp. at 614.
82. Id. at 616.
83. Id (quoting Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 730 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980)
(emphasis in original)). See E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 194-202.
84. 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affl'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
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piracy, to permit authors to take well-known phrases and frag-
ments from copyrighted works and add their own contribu-
tions of commentary or humor.
8 5
Even this opinion is tainted, however, as evidenced by com-
mentary in a footnote: "We have no occasion in this case to
consider the limiting principle that arises when attempts at
parody take the form of scatalogical humor."86
J. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.
Defendants' theatre displayed the film Debbie Does Dallas
which portrayed "Debbie" in an outfit similar to that made fa-
mous by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders. The outfit was
worn or partially worn in the film's final scene for approxi-
mately twelve minutes, while various explicit sexual acts were
performed.7
The Second Circuit held that "defendants' use of plaintiff's
uniform hardly qualifies as parody or any other form of fair
use,"88 and found this use of the uniforms infringing.
Interestingly, the court felt compelled to state, "This is not a
case of government censorship, but a private plaintiff's attempt
to protect its property rights .... The prohibition of the Lan-
ham Act is content neutral."' 9 Strangely, the court's own char-
acterization of the film as "defendants' sexually depraved
film" 90 sounded less than neutral.
IV
Judicial Abuse Of Discretion In Fair Use
The purpose behind the copyright laws must be remembered
when determining the proper scope of fair use as a defense for
parody. The United States Supreme Court defined the purpose
and policy of copyright as: "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
85. 720 F.2d at 242.
86. Id. at 242 n.8.
87. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202-
03 (2d Cir. 1979).
88. Id at 206. The basis of the opinion was actually trademark infringement as a
violation of the Lanham Act.
89. Id.
90. Id, at 205.
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through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.' ",9
It is apparent that the courts have lost sight of this purpose.
Clearly, if authors were not permitted to protect their works,
such that no profit would be realized, there might be little in-
centive to dedicate one's life to the creation of original works.
Yet by providing this encouragement and protection, the Copy-
right Act does not empower the courts to shield these works
from comment, whether it be critical, humorous or even ob-
scene. As the Second Circuit noted:
[A]ny work of sufficient notoriety to be the object of parody
has already secured for its proprietor considerable financial
benefit. According that proprietor further protection against
parody does little to promote creativity, but it places a substan-
tial inhibition upon the creativity of authors adept at using par-
ody to entertain, inform, or stir public consciousness.
92
The statutory factors to be considered in determining what
constitutes fair use, as codified in section 107, are: (1) the pur-
pose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used;
and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market.93 The
courts' application of these four factors evidences a need for the
judiciary to re-orient the discretion given to them by the
Coypyright Act when evaluating alleged infringement by
parodists.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
One of the principal reasons cited by the courts in denying
fair use is the commercial nature of the parody.94 Section 107's
enumeration of the purpose and character of the use as a factor,
however, does not require that it be applied in parody cases.9
The relative weight of each factor in section 107 varies accord-
ing to the type of appropriation alleged.96 It appears obvious
that the commercial gain of the infringer is relevant in situa-
91. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See Washington Co. v. Pearson, 306
U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
92. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir.
1983).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
94. See Walt Disney, 389 F. Supp. at 1397-98; MCA, 677 F.2d at 185.
95. M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 381.
96. Id. See Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Copyright
Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REV. 735, 741-45 (1983).
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tions such as the photocopying of the original, where non-profit
educational use would be a defense.97 Accordingly, the applica-
tion of commerciality to parody is nonsensical, especially con-
sidering that the performance of virtually all parodies is for
profit.
In light of parody's inherently commercial nature, it appears
that a judge who relies on commerciality for his finding of in-
fringement, since it is present in virtually all cases, is actually
camouflaging the true motivations for his ruling. As stated by
Samuel Johnson, "No man but a blockhead ever wrote except
for money." 98 In Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures
Corp.,99 the defendant's commercial use of the "Mickey Mouse
March" was cited as voiding a fair use defense due to the de-
fendant's commercial gain.1"' Yet Mad Magazine's parody of
fifty-seven songs,10' and Saturday Night Live's use of the mel-
ody and half the words to "I Love New York"'0 2 were deter-
mined fair use, despite a commercial situation similar to
Mature Pictures. The clear distinguishing point is the porno-
graphic nature of Mature's Happy Hooker, as evidenced by the
court's characterization of it as a "display of bestiality."'0 3
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Courts also focus on the original work in addition to the al-
legedly infringing work. In traditional infringement cases, the
nature of the original work is relevant to the permissible
amount that may be used by the latter work. For example, the
courts are more likely to find fair use in the partial appropria-
tion of scholarly works, as republication is for the benefit of
mankind or medical science.10 4 Similarly, certain works, such
as indexes, virtually require copying for their use.'05
The nature of the original work has no viability as a factor to
determine fair use by a parody, however, as all types of works
are fair game for criticism, whether by parody, satire or con-
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976). See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 402-04.
98. J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 623 (1971).
99. 389 F. Supp. 1398.
100. Id. at 1398. See Barron, supra note 52, at 31.
101. 329 F.2d 541.
102. 482 F. Supp. 741.
103. 389 F. Supp. at 1397.
104. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
105. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
1977).
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ventional criticism. 10 6
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Courts frequently deny fair use protection by characterizing
a parody as a substantial taking of the original work. Again, it
must be noted that a parody is different from other types of
appropriation. By its very nature, a parody is required to copy
at least a portion of the original work, since there is no parody
absent association with the original."0 7
Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co.,108 deter-
mined that The Greatest American Hero was not a substantial
taking, despite the obvious similarities to the original "Super-
man," references to "Superman," and direct appropriation of
dialogue.10 9 A substantial similarity was found, however, in the
topless "Ex-Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders" poster,1 0 despite un-
likely confusion with the original. Substantial takings were
also found in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson"' and Walt Disney Produc-
tions v. Air Pirates."2 The common element found in the cases
of these losing defendants was the pornographic nature of their
parodies.
When the United States Supreme Court explicitly considered
fair use for the first time in 1984," it held that even a verbatim
taking can be fair use when the use poses no threat of commer-
cial detriment to the original." 4 The substantiality of the por-
tion used, however, has been mentioned in fair use decisions
more than any other single factor.
D. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market
When one considers that the true purpose of copyright law is
to encourage the creation of original works, the effect of the
taking on the original work should be the most important fac-
tor. A traditional infringement analysis focuses on the effect of
106. See Comment, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585,
603 (1956).
107. See R. FALK supra note 4; F. STILLMAN, supra note 4, at xiv.
108. 720 F.2d 231.
109. Id. at 243-44; 523 F. Supp. at 616.
110. 600 F.2d 1184.
111. 425 F. Supp. 443.
112. 581 F.2d 751.
113. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(home videotaping of television programs is fair use).
114. Id. at 449-51.
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the use on the potential market and examines the potential or
actual competition between the two works. 115 Courts rarely
find fair use where both plaintiff's and defendant's works meet
the same demand in the same market."6 Yet when the infring-
ing work does not compete with or adversely affect the original,
it can be determined a fair use." 7
The United States Supreme Court has supported the fair use
defense in two cases and, while neither case involved parody,
the rationale used in each opinion is illustrative. In Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax),"8 the
Court endorsed Congress' flexible view of the fair use doctrine,
yet indicated that a fair use analysis should focus principally on
the effect of the use on economic incentive." 9 The Court held
that where there was no actual or potential economic detri-
ment to the copyright holder, the "prohibition of such.., uses
would merely inhibit access to ideas" without providing any
countervailing economic incentive to the author. 2 °
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,'2 '
the Court reinforced Betamax, stating that the effect of the use
on the potential market for a copyrighted work "is undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use. 122
When the taking is by a parody of a sexual or pornographic
nature, however, this key factor is either ignored or glossed
over. For example, if the court had not been influenced by the
"raunchy, jaded porno palate" of the parody in MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson,2 3 but had merely considered the economic issue, it
might have found fair use since it is doubtful the sales of
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" would have been harmed by
"Champion." To the contrary, interest in the original would
probably have been heightened in those few familiar with the
parody. It is equally unlikely that Walt Disney Productions
115. See Hayes, C'assroom "Fair Use": A Reevaluation, 26 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 101, 108 (1978).
116. 434 F. Supp. at 221, 223-24.
117. Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 458 F. Supp. 65, 69-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Copy-
right Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REV. 735, 753 (1983).
118. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
119. Id. at 449-51.
120. Id. at 450-51. See Comment, The Parody Defense to Copyright: Productive
Fair Use After Betamax, supra note 62, at 1406-07.
121. 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
122. Id. at 2234.
123. 677 F.2d at 181.
[Vol. 8
REQUIEM FOR A PARODY
would have suffered by the Happy Hooker rendition of the
"Mickey Mouse March". In all probability there were few of
the "scrubbed faces and bright smiles" attributed to Mickey's
world in the Pussycat Theatres.'24
Undoubtedly, Walt Disney Productions and MCA are not
pleased with these uses of their works, but sensitivities must
bend with entry into the marketplace. It is not the function of
the courts to protect the sensibilities of artists and copyright
holders from criticism and parodies of their work, just as it is
not within the proper realm of copyright law for the judiciary
to allow itself to be influenced by its own disregard for works of
a sexual or obscene nature.
A workable reconciliation of parody with general copyright
infringement must acknowledge that parody can legitimately
aim at artistically destroying the original, despite the economic
repercussions. 125 Destructive parodies, like celebrated critics,
play an important role in social and literary criticism, even
though they may discourage or discredit the author of the origi-
nal work.
126
Any doubt concerning the propriety of considering the con-
tent of the work was erased in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v.
Cinema Adult Theater.127 In that case, the Fifth Circuit held
that a copyrighted work cannot be appropriated with impunity
simply because the original work was obscene. In commenting
on the content-neutrality of the Copyright Act, the court noted:
Congress has enacted two statutory copyright restrictions that
were arguably content based, but afterwards repealed them.
After the language "composition designed or suited for public
representation," which was contained in the 1856 version of the
Copyright Act . . . was construed ... to mean that the moral
content of the work had to be suitable for public consumption
(rather than the more natural meaning of "suited" by form, i.e.
capable of being performed on the stage), Congress deleted the
"suited" language from the next version of the Act .... A later
version of the Act... contained language arguably placing con-
tent restrictions on the copyrightability of engravings, cuts and
124. This reference is actually from a different case. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753 (citing Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amend-
ment, supra note 33, at 582).
125. Comment, The Parody Defense to Copyright: Productive Fair Use After
Betamax, supra note 62, at 1411 (citing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPY-
RIGHT 69 (1967)).
126. Id. at 1395.
127. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
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prints. (The Act provided that such works were copyrightable
only if "connected with the fine arts.") After this language
was narrowly construed by the Supreme Court, . . . the lan-
guage was deleted from the 1909 version of the Act, which is
controlling in this case, leaving no content-based restrictions in
the Act.
128
Although Mitchell Bros. concerned appropriation of an ob-
scene work, rather than appropriation by an obscene work, the
requirement of content-neutral enforcement of the copyright
laws is clearly required of the latter as well.
V
Conclusion
Section 107 remains a viable balancing test for determining
the validity of fair use in general. The very nature of parody,
however, requires that it be viewed as distinct from other forms
of fair use appropriation. The same amorphous characteristics
of the Copyright Act that allow effective and equitable deter-
minations of what constitutes fair use also grant the courts dis-
cretion which may effectively serve to silence the voice of
parody.
Whether the resulting abuse of discretion in denying fair use
to these works is based on the courts' personal distaste for the
parodies' sexual content or an ingenious use of the Copyright
Act to circumvent ineffective "pornography" laws is beyond the
scope of this comment. The resulting inequity and bias is evi-
dent, however, and must be rectified.
An understanding of the nature of parody and its role in
literature demonstrates a need for a means of legal analysis as
distinct as the medium itself. Accordingly, the factors provided
in the Copyright Act must either be implemented by the courts
without content prejudice, or appropriately altered so as to ef-
fectively eradicate the potential for abuse.
128. Id. at 855 n.4.
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